

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDO		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 80px; margin: 10px 0;"></div> <p>The attached material deals with allegations about Soviet intelligence relationships to SALT.</p> <p>Please let me know your reactions on my proposed course of action.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100px; margin: 20px auto;"></div>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Deputy Director for Intelligence			13 Mar.
<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DDI-687-75

Office of the Director

SP - 26/75
10 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Article by Paul H. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance
Between Hope and Skepticism"

1. In Paul Nitze's article which first appeared in the winter 1974-75 issue of Foreign Policy, published in December 1974, he made a number of allegations about Soviet personnel and their behavior at the first SALT session in Helsinki. Attachment 1 is an extract of a cable from Mr. Howard Stoertz in which he discusses the article and its possible implications. Mr. Stoertz has also suggested the text of a letter to Mr. Nitze on this subject (Attachment 2), requesting that it be staffed within the Agency.

2. Before any final proposal for handling this matter is surfaced to the DCI, Mr. Stoertz has suggested that it be cleared with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Accordingly, your comments are requested on the action proposed in the attachments.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachments

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

-2-

SP - 26/75

SUBJECT: Article by Paul H. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance
Between Hope and Skepticism"

Distribution:

Dr. Edward W. Proctor, DDI
Mr. Carl E. Duckett, DDS&T
Mr. George A. Carver, D/DCI/NIO
Mr. David S. Brandwein, D/OTS
Mr. Act. Ch. DDO/CMG
Mr. Chief, SALT Support Staff

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

25X1

CABLE: From Stoertz to dated 5 March 1975

1. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN AN ARTICLE WHICH FIRST APPEARED IN FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE IN JANUARY, PAUL NITZE MADE A NUMBER OF ALLEGATIONS ABOUT SOVIET PERSONNEL AND THEIR BEHAVIOR AT THE FIRST SALT SESSION IN HELSINKI IN NOVEMBER 1969:

A. IN REVIEWING THE COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, NITZE STATED THAT AT LEAST A THIRD OF THE SOVIET STAFF (INCLUDING THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DELEGATION) HAD HAD KGB EXPERIENCE, THAT MANY OF THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS HAD AFFILIATION WITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND THAT ALL THEIR CHAUFFEURS WERE OFFICER IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

B. IN DISCUSSING THE SECURITY SITUATION, NITZE STATED THAT WHEN THE US DELEGATION MOVED INTO ITS OFFICES, IT WAS FOUND THAT A TASS CORRESPONDENT HAD RENTED AN OVERLOOKING ROOM, WHICH WAS EQUIPPED WITH TELESCOPES, ANTENNAS AND OTHER GADGETS. HE SAID IT SOON BECAME APPARENT THAT ALL BUT THE MOST SECURE TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS (PRESUMABLY OF THE US DELEGATION) WERE TAPPED.

C. IN DISCUSSING SOVIET TACTICS, NITZE SAID THE SOVIETS TRIED TO "BREAK DOWN" INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE US TEAM, TO GET PEOPLE TO DRINK TOO MUCH, AND TO FLATTER INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS IN THE HOPE OF PLAYING ON POSSIBLE DISAGREEMENTS AMONG THEM. HE ALSO DESCRIBED A SOVIET-HOSTED TRIP TO LENINGRAD AS A TACTIC OF INFLUENCE.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

2. THE FOREGOING LED INTO THE MAIN PART OF NITZE'S ARTICLE WHICH WAS A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET AND US NEGOTIATING METHODS, OF SOVIET AND US OBJECTIVES IN SALT, AND OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND DETENTE IN GENERAL. THERE MAY OR MAY NOT BE MERIT IN THE POSITIONS MR. NITZE TOOK IN THE MAIN PART OF HIS ARTICLE. CERTAINLY HE IS EXPERIENCED AND RESPECTED IN STRATEGIC MATTERS, HE IS ENTITLED TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS, AND IN POINT OF FACT I AM IN SYMPATHY WITH SOME OF THEM. BUT THE STATEMENTS PARAPHRASED ABOVE ARE DISTORTED, AND I WONDER IF THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO UNCHALLENGED.

3. BASED ON A REVIEW OF [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1 EYES ONLY MESSAGE [REDACTED] IN EARLY FEBRUARY, THE FACTS ARE:

25X1 A. OF 29 PERSONS LISTED [REDACTED] AS PRINCIPALS, ADVISORS, EXPERTS AND INTERPRETERS ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE FIRST
25X1 SALT SESSION [REDACTED] WERE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO HAVE
25X1 HAD SOME CURRENT OR PRIOR AFFILIATION WITH EITHER THE KGB OR
25X1 THE GRU, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (A MUCH SMALLER PROPORTION OF
THE "SUPPORT" GROUP IS LISTED AS HAVING INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATIONS,
BUT MANY OF THE PERSONS IN THIS GROUP WERE SO LITTLE KNOWN THAT
25X1 MEANINGFUL [REDACTED] THIS
IS A COMBINED TOTAL FOR BOTH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND IT
INCLUDES SUSPECTED AS WELL AS PAST AFFILIATIONS. IF ONLY PRESENT
OR CONFIRMED AFFILIATIONS WERE COUNTED, THE PROPORTIONS WOULD DROP,

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

-3-

B. A ROOM ACROSS THE COURTYARD FROM THE OFFICES OF THE US DELEGATION, TEMPORARILY QUARTERED AT THE BACK OF THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND, WAS INDEED OCCUPIED BY A TASS CORRESPONDENT WHO WAS ALSO A SUSPECTED KGB MEMBER. HE HAD OCCUPIED THE ROOM FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, PRIOR TO WHICH THE SAME ROOM HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY OTHER SOVIETS. NO TELESCOPES OR OTHER GADGETS WERE KNOWN TO BE IN THE TASS CORRESPONDENT'S ROOM.

C. THE DELEGATION WAS WARNED TO ASSUME THAT ALL OPEN PHONE LINES WERE MONITORED. THERE WAS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE.

D. ONE INCIDENT OF A POSSIBLE RECRUITING ATTEMPT AT A COCKTAIL PARTY WAS REPORTED BY A MEMBER OF THE US DELEGATION. IT WAS NOT CONFIRMED AND NOT REPEATED.

E. SOVIET HOSPITALITY AT HELSINKI AND LENINGRAD WAS TYPICALLY LAVISH. SOVIET PRIDE IN LENINGRAD AS CULTURAL CENTER, FORMER CAPITOL, AND HEROIC STRONGHOLD WAS TYPICALLY EFFUSIVE.

4. THE CONCLUSION ONE MUST REACH IS THAT MR. NITZE'S STATEMENTS ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED, AND THAT SINISTER IMPLICATIONS ARE NOT BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS AS WE KNOW THEM. IN SOME RESPECTS, OF COURSE, EVEN THE RELEVANCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IS QUESTIONABLE.

25X1 I PROPOSE, [REDACTED] RECORDS ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION ARE INCOMPLETE -- A NOT UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY -- AND A LARGER NUMBER OF THEM HAD HAD INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE? SEVERAL LEADING MEMBERS OF THE US DELEGATION HAD HAD SUCH EXPERIENCE. IT HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE USSR

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

AND ITS WEAPON SYSTEMS, WHICH AFTER ALL WERE WHAT THE US WAS AIMING TO LIMIT THRU THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. IT PROVED NOTHING WHATEVER ABOUT US BEHAVIOR AND TACTICS AT HELSINKI.

5. SOME HERE WERE CONCERNED INITIALLY THAT MR. NITZE'S STATEMENTS MIGHT AFFECT THE SALT AND SCC NEGOTIATIONS ADVERSELY. A COUPLE OF SOVIET SCC NEGOTIATORS WARNED PRIVATELY THAT THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. SO FAR, THERE IS NO RECOGNIZABLE SIGN OF ADVERSE EFFECTS AND IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD LET A SMALL MATTER SUCH AS THIS INFLUENCE ITS MAJOR POLICY OBJECTIVIES. NEVERTHELESS, STANDING UNCHALLENGED AND BEING REPEATED AS THEY ARE BY BOTH MR. NITZE AND THE US PRESS, SUCH ALLEGATIONS COULD FUEL SUSPICIONS IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND COULD CAUSE UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTY DURING THE PROCESS OF RATIFYING THE NEW AGREEMENT IN THE US.

6. MY OWN EXPERIENCE AS HIS HELPER AND COLLEAGUE THRU MANY SALT SESSIONS IS THAT MR. NITZE DOES NOT KNOWINGLY GIVE OUT FALSE INFORMATION AND IS WILLING TO DROP OR CORRECT ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS IF HE BECOMES SATISFIED THAT HE IS IN ERROR. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, DURING RATIFICATION HEARINGS, AMB. JOHNSON OR MR. COLBY WERE ASKED WHETHER NITZE'S CHARGES WERE TRUE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO REPLY "NO," AT THAT POINT, THE QUESTION WOULD ARISE, "HAVE YOU TOLD HIM SO, AND IF NOT WHY NOT?" I SUPPOSE ONE COULD FALL BACK ON THE ARGUMENT THAT MR. NITZE IS NO LONGER IN THE GOVERNMENT, BUT AFTER ALL, HE IS A DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN, HE WAS AT SALT ONE, HE MIGHT WELL CORRECT THE RECORD HIMSELF IF INFORMED, AND IN ANY EVENT

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SAY WE HAD ATTEMPTED TO SET HIM STRAIGHT.

7. IF IT WERE DECIDED TO DO THIS, I BELIVE THE APPROPRIATE WAY WOULD BE TO SEND MR. NITZE A BRIEF, UNCLASSIFIED LETTER GIVING WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION AND OFFERING TO DISCUSS THE FACTS AND OUR INTERPRETATION WITH HIM. A DRAFT OF SUCH A LETTER IS ATTACHED. I AM NOT CERTAIN WHO SHOULD SIGN SUCH A LETTER OR WHO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK WITH MR. NITZE IF HE TAKES UP THE INVITATION.

I THINK IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF THE PERSON WHO TALKED WITH MR. NITZE WERE SOMEONE WHO WAS ACTUALLY PRESENT AT THE SESSION IN QUESTION. MY TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT MR. COLBY SIGN THE LETTER AND THAT [REDACTED] OR DAVE BRANDWEIN, OR BOTH, BE ASSIGNED TO TALK WITH MR. NITZE. BUT I WILL LEAVE IT UP TO OTHERS TO JUDGE THESE MOALITIES AS WELL AS THE WISDOM OF THE PROPOSAL ITSELF. ONE PERSON WHOSE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SOLICITED IS SID GRAYBEAL, WHO WAS AT THE FIRST HELSINKI SESSION AND IS POINT MAN IN THE SCC.

8. THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS WERE DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR JOHNSON, AND HE HAS READ THE DRAFT LETTER. THE INITIATIVE WAS MINE, NOT HIS. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING HE WOULD WELCOME SUCH A LETTER, BUT HE BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE ENTIRELY UP TO BILL COLBY AS TO WHETHER BILL WANTED TO TAKE ON THIS PARTICULAR PROBLEM AT THIS TIME.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030030-3

SECRET